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ENFORCEMENT OF UNION FINES

Labor Law-Judicial Enforcement of Labor Union
Fines in State Courts
Two locals of the United Auto Workers, operating under a
union security agreement, called economic strikes against the AllisChalmers Manufacturing Company after authorization by two
thirds of the membership. Several union members refused to participate in the strikes and returned to work. Following settlement
of the strikes, the union tried these members before the proper union
tribunal on charges of conduct unbecoming a union member and
imposed fines ranging from twenty to one hundred dollars. Upon
the refusal of several members to pay, the union successfully sued
in the state court to enforce the fine. Allis-Chalmers then filed
charges with the National Labor Relations Board1 alleging that the
union's action was an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (1)
(A) of the Labor-Management Relation Act in that it restrained
or coerced the members in the exercise of their section 7 right3 to
"refrain" from concerted activities. On appeal the Supreme Court
held that section 8(b) (1) (A) prohibits neither the imposition of
reasonable fines on full union members nor the judicial enforcement
of such fines.4
The Court, relying heavily upon legislative history, found that
section 8(b) (1) (A) was aimed mainly at organizational tactics of
unions and that it was not intended to apply to internal union affairs.
' The Board dismissed the complaint. 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964). A three
judge panel of the Seventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the dismissal, 34
U.S.L. WEEK 2157 (1965) (the decision has been withdrawn and will not
appear in the official reports). The Seventh Circuit on rehearing en banc
reversed (4 to 3), 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966). The Supreme Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit in a 5 to 4 decision, 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
'§ 8(b) (1) (A) states "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 157 (§ 7) of this title:" The section then
adds a proviso, "That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein ...

."

Labor Management Relations Act

§ 8(b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964), [hereinafter cited as
Taft-Hartley].
' § 7 states "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ......
Taft-Hartley § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
' NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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This construction avoided the essential and perplexing problem
inherent in all union disciplinary cases-the conflict between the
section 8(b)(1) (A) proviso and the member's section 7 rights.'
The reliability of the legislative history of the section is, at best,
limited. Reliance must be placed exclusively upon the Senate
debates,' a notably inferior source of legislative history, due to
the fact that section 8(b) (1) (A) was not included in the original
Senate bill as it emerged from the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare,7 but was added as an amendment; and since the conference
The
committee adopted the Senate's version without change.'
available history is, at most, evidence of the intent of one half of
Congress, and that intent is unclear as evidenced by the conflicts
in testimony of the various senators regarding the scope of section
8(b) (1) (A). Remarks of Senators Taft' and Pepper' indicate
a basis from which a reasonable argument can be made establishing
that a secondary purpose of section 8(b) (1) (A) was to protect
union members from their leaders."'
In light of the brevity and internal conflict of the legislative
history argument, the majority sought to bolster its decision by
18
12
reliance on the section 8(b) (1) (A) proviso and pure policy.
r The union's right to make rules in relation to the acquisition or retention
of membership (the § 8(b)(1) (A) proviso) versus the employee's right
to participate in or refrain from concerted activity (§ 7 Rights).
8 P. MISHKIN & C. MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS, 404-5
(1965).
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947), cited in 1 N.L.R.B.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

AcT, 1947,

at 441 (1948) [hereinafter cited as 1947 Leg. Hist.].
s The report of the committee was unrevealing.
'"If there is anything clear in the development of labor union history in
the past 10 years it is that more and more labor union employees have come
to be subject to the orders of labor union leaders. The bill provides for
the right of protest against arbitrary powers which have been exercised
by some of the labor union leaders." 93 Cong. Rec. 4023 (1947), cited in 2
Leg. Hist. 1028.
10 "This amendment is an effort to protect the workers against their own
leaders, chosen by them under their own constitution and by-laws." 93 Cong.
Rec. 4023 (1947), in 2 Leg. Hist. 1029.
" Comment, 8(b)(1)(A) Linitations Upon The Right Of A Union To
Fine Its Members, 115 U. of PA. L. Rzv. 47, 52 (1966).
12 "...
[S]uch a distinction [between court enforcement and expulsion]
would visit upon the member of a strong union a potentially more severe
punishment than court enforcement of fines, while impairing the bargaining
facility of the weak union by requiring it either to condone misconduct or
to deplete its ranks." N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175,

192 (1967).
1" "Where the union is weak, and membership therefore of little value,
the union faced with further depletion of its ranks may have no real choice
except to condone the member's disobedience. Yet it is just such weak unions
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Each of these approaches is open to attacks of varying merit. The
Court's argument based on the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A),
which guarantees to unions the right to "prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. . ." is valid only when asserted against an attempt to proscribe
all fines, rather than only those judicially enforced. Simply stated,
the Court's argument is that since Congress allowed a greater coercive means (expulsion), it could not have intended to prohibit
a lesser one (fines). The rationale is sound when limited to fines
backed by expulsion since they are always less coercive than expulsion due to the fact that the member may opt out rather than
pay. But it fails completely when viewed in the context of a weak
union judicially enforcing a fine. Obviously the fine is more coercive than expulsion, otherwise the union would not find it necessary
to employ the courts to enforce it.
The Court's argument based on public policy-that weak unions,
if deprived of the power to judicially enforce fines, will either have
to condone wrongdoing or deplete their ranks-is by far its
strongest. Either of the above would greatly hamper the union in
its statutory obligation to bargain collectively and, as the Court
determined, effectively. However, although it may be beneficial to
nourish sickly unions at the expense of their members, is not this a
policy determination better left to Congress? In fact, a contrary
intent may be glossed from the Act in its allowance of free elections,' 4 resignation of members,' 5 decertification petitions,' and
prohibition of compulsory membership, absent a collective bargain7
ing agreement to the contrary..
Justice White, who concurred with the Court's decision, implicitly rejected the Court's interpretation of the legislative history
of section 8(b) (1) (A) 8 and employed the proviso to reach his
for which the power to execute union decisions taken for the benefit of all
employees is most critical to effective discharge of its statutory function."
Id. at 183-84.
" Taft-Hartley § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
" Employees have the right to refrain from union activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. Taft-Hartley
§ 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
Taft-Hartley § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
Taft-Hartley § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
2 Mr. Justice White joins the dissenters in their belief that § 8(b) (1) (A)
is broader than merely organizational tactics and therefore applies to union
discipline.
'
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Consequently, a majority of five justices rejected the

interpretation of 8(b) (1) (A) which formed the foundation for
the Court's decision. justice White and the four dissenters read
8 (b) (1) (A) as extending beyond organizational tactics onto the
sphere of internal union discipline. His opinion tenuously 20 accepts
the majority's "greater-lesser" proposition "[that] there is no
basis for thinking that Congress, having accepted expulsion as a
permissible technique to enforce a rule in derrogation of section 7
rights, nevertheless intended to bar enforcement by another method
which may be far less coercive."21
Justice White appears to err along with the majority in crystalizing the issue as one of allowance or prohibition of all fines, thereby
making the proviso argument viable. As noted above, this argument
fails when applied to judicially enforced fines since they may often
be more coercive than expulsion. Justice White's rationale, though
faulty, is more conceptually consistent with the balance of the Act
than the Court's approach which, carried to its logical conclusion,
would allow violence and coercion as long as they were employed
in internal affairs of the union rather than in organizational drives.
His approach does not foreclose the applicability of 8(b) (1) (A)
to non-organizational areas, but merely limits its application in internal union affairs by way of the proviso.
II
In light of the lack of precedent in the area of union discipline
and the dirth of legislative background, Allis-Chalmers presented
the Court with an opportunity to adopt the "result-orientated ' 2 2
a union may expel to enforce its own internal rules, even
though a particular rule limits the § 7 rights of its members and
even though expulsion to enforce it would be a clear and serious
brand of "coercion" imposed in derogation of those § 7 rights. Such
restraint and coercion Congress permitted by adding the proviso to
19 Hence,

§ 8(b) (1) (A).

388 U.S. 175, 197-98 (1967) (concurring opinion).
"' "But the Court seems unanimous in upholding the rule against
crossing picket lines during a strike and its enforceability by expulsion from membership. On this premise I think the opinion written
for the Court is the more persuasive and sensible construction of the
statute and I therefore join it, although I am doubtful about the
implications of some of its generalized statements."
Id. 2at 199. (concurring opinion).
Id. at 198. (concurring opinion).
2 Union Disciplinary Power And Section 8(b)(1)(A) Of The National
Labor Relations Act: Limitations On The Immunity Doctrine, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 584, 589 (1966).
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approach which has recently gained favor with the Board23 and to
replace its traditional "means" test. The "result" approach is simply
a balancing of all the interests involved and is akin to the nexus
or balance of interests approach often applied to constitutional
problems. It appears that this approach is the only avenue to a
conceptually sound, workable body of labor law. 4
Concededly the "nexus" approach is more difficult to administer
than the traditional means test but the results should be infinitely
more satisfying from both a practical and conceptual viewpoint. It
takes into consideration five variables: (1) the permissible objective of the union as related to the furtherance of union goals;
(2) the source of union power; (3) the means used to achieve the
permissible objective; (4) the degree of invasion upon the member's rights; and (5) the right of the member to be protected from
coercion.
The initial inquiry is whether the union's objective is permissible,
and if permissible, how closely is it related to the furtherance of
work-related collective employee goals.2" The source of union power
is the next important variable in ascertaining the degree of invasion of members' rights permissible in a given situation. The
manner of acquisition of members determines the rights acquired
by the union, i.e., the union should acceed to a greater number of
rights when membership is voluntary rather than forced. An open
shop situation exemplifies voluntary surrender while a union security
shop may embody both voluntary surrender and forced grant.
The "means" must be viewed from dual perspectives: their effectiveness and exclusiveness in achieving the desired union goal and
their effect upon the rights of members-the degree of invasion.
The following commonly employed means are scaled in descending
order according to degrees of invasion: violence, court enforced
fines, expulsion, suspension, and fines enforceable by expulsion.
Violence, probably the most effective method of achieving union
goals, is always proscribed. The right to be protected is the final
variable and will usually be the employee's right to engage in or
" See Id. at 590.
"4This is the approach taken by the Labor Board in Local 138, Int'l
Union of Operating Engineers, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964), where it protected
the right of a union member to file charges against his union with impunity
from internal union fines.
" The closeness of the relationship or the necessity determines the value
of the permissible objective.
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refrain from some concerted activity. Some difficulty arises in
attempting to evaluate this right in different contexts. At present,
it appears that a member's greatest right is his access to the board,2"
while the right to file a decertificatian petition is of little value.27
Permissible Objective and Member's Right to be Protected
The Allis-Chalmers problem is perplexing because both the permissible objective and the member's right are of great value. Solidarity (the permissible objective) is crucial during a strike period,
but then so is the worker's right to make decisions which have a
marked incidence upon his individual well-being: the striker loses
his wages and possibly his job.2 8 This standoff in interests demands
that the means employed be formulated with precision to satisfy
best both interests-the greatest effectiveness with the least invasion. A deeper probing of the three remaining variables is necessary to a "result" approach to Allis-Chalmers.
Source of Union Power
The basic inquiry at this point is the voluntariness of the member's association with the union in a security shop situation. If a
man voluntarily joins the union, he is subject to its discipline. But
if his membership is a product of the security agreement, the union
may not impose its will upon him since a security agreement may
not be used for any purpose other than the collection of dues and
fees.2" Theoretically at least, voluntariness will also be a vital
factor in the litigation to collect the fines since the union's cause of
action has been traditionally based upon the contract theory. 0
Several aspects of the present security shop situation negate
voluntariness. The typical agreement states that membership is
required, as does the Taft-Hartley Act."1 The average worker, not
being an avid reader of the federal reporters, will not know that
membership has been whittled down to its "financial core."'8 2 Even
if the "financial core" option is spelled out in the contract, most
Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964).
Tawas Tube Prods. Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965).
See N.L.R.B. v. Mackey Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
2 Radio Officers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954).
oInternational Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620 (1958).
1
3 Taft-Hartley § 8(A)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(A)(3)
(1964).
' N.L.R.B. v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), held that
the Taft-Hartley union security clause did not permit any more than the
collection of union dues and fees.
28
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employees will not be cognizant of this fact. Assuming that the
worker has the requisite knowledge, is his decision to accept full
membership voluntary in the absence of a valid alternative? The
majority of unions assess the same dues and fees upon both the
"financial core" and the full member who enjoys all the attendant
union benefits. In effect the unions are saying to prospective members, "You must pay X dollars to us every month or lose your
job. You may choose limited membership and receive nothing for
your money, or full membership and receive a voice and a vote in
union decisions, plus any internal union benefits financed out of
dues and fees." It would be an extreme test of the elasticity of
logic to term the selection of full membership under these conditions
a voluntary choice. Board member Leedom captured the essence
of the situation in one pithy sentence: "Who can say as a verity that
a man forced to buy a cake will not eat it ?""s
Union constitutional restrictions limiting resignation also taint
the voluntariness of the continuing association between union and
members. The First Circuit has upheld a United Auto Workers
constitutional provision requiring that all resignations be submitted
by registered mail to the financial secretary of the member's local
within ten days of the end of the fiscal year."4 Membership can
not be genuinely voluntary unless the union offers dissident members a continuing, realistic choice to opt out of the union. The right
to refrain from union activities becomes illusory if unions can
judicially force obligations upon dissidents thus frozen into membership.
The Court in Allis-Chalmers concerned itself solely with the
member's present status-was he a "full member?" Motivation for
the membership was considered irrelevant. This approach allows
the coercive security agreement to be used for a purpose other than
to compel payment of union dues and fees 8 -- a clear violation of
the section 8(A) (3) proviso. 6 If judicial enforcement is to be
" General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 451, 463 (1961) (dissenting
opinion).
N.L.R.B. v. U.A.W., 320 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1963).
8'Radio Officers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
" Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination
against an employee for non-membership in a labor organization (A)
if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was
not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated
for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the
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permitted, the courts must offer some protection against the misuse
of the security clause."' The union should bear the burden of
proving that the prospective member knew of his choice between
financial core and full membership and voluntarily made it. Also
the choice should be realistic-financial core members charged only
their fair share of the bargaining costs, or charged equal dues with
all other members but also receiving equal benefits which could not
be divested. 8 The only difference between the two types of membership in the latter situation would be the franchise. The courts should
also limit resignation restrictions to the barest minimum reasonable
in order to insure the continuing voluntariness of the association.
Degree of Invasion

"Where the union is strong and membership therefore valuable,
to require expulsion of the member visits a far more severe
penalty upon the member than a reasonable fine.""0 The above
statement is a truism but obfuscates the real issue-whether fines
should be judicially enforcable. There has been no attempt to require unions to expel rather than fine delinquent members. This
choice is, and should be, left to the unions. A fine backed by expulsion can not be more coercive than one enforced by court action.
The individual member is in the best possible position to balance,
on a personal basis, the benefits of union membership against the
amount of the fine, and to choose the less coercive path, be it expulsion or payment of the fine.
Allowing judicial enforcement will force the member into costly
and time consuming litigation. Many employee rights will fall by
default simply because the cost of litigation is greater than the
amount of the fine." Also, the uncertainty of litigation will induce
periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition
of acquiring or retaining membership...
Taft.-Hartley § 8(a)(3) 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
37 Requiring membership under the security clause and then using that
membership to impose court enforced fines upon those who are unwilling
to participate in union activities constitutes subversion of § 8(A) (3).
'The choice between the alternative types of financial core memberships
should be left to the unions since they will face the resultant bookkeeping
problems.
"N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 183 (1967).
40 "The very fact that so few cases involve individuals unsupported by
factional groups suggests that the lone member's rights go by default, and
many lawyers frankly admitted that they would not take a case unless it
was backed by a substantial group." Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 222 (1960).
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many members to forego their statutory protections since there is
no chance of a double loss-attorney's fees plus fine-if the member
acceeds and pays the fine.
Since the majority of state courts base their consideration of
these fines on the contract theory, their main inquiry is whether the
member's action was proscribed in the union constitution or bylaws, and whether there is substantial evidence to support the fine."1
This appellate approach taken by state courts certainly deprives
the disciplined member of the protection he deserves on the fact
finding level of the litigation. There is seldom an inquiry into
whether the membership (hence the contract) was coercive. This
should be a controlling factor in the litigation. Also, judicial enforcement would arm the unions with a great auxiliary power, the
power to force a member into submission by the threat of a large
fine. How many members whose names appear on the union rolls
will be willing to ignore the threat in the hope that they will later
be able to convince the Board or the state court that they were not
full members or that the fines were unreasonable?
The Necessity of the Means
The rationale behind section 8(A) (3) is that the union should
be allowed to contract with the employer to force non-union employees, who are deriving benefits from union representation, to
If unions are limited to
pay their share of the bargaining costs.'
enforcement by expulsion, the rationale behind section 8 (A) (3) will
be frustrated since the expelled employee will no longer have to
43
pay dues and the union will be powerless to affect his job status,
while still retaining the duty to represent him equally.44 Expulsion
in the security shop situation puts the disciplined member in a better
position than his financial core brethren in that he enjoys all the
benefits of a non-full member, i.e., equal representation, with none
of the burdens, i.e., payment of his share of the bargaining costs.
The effect of this "discipline" upon union solidarity during the
11ANNOT., 21 A.L.R.2d 1397, 1442 (1952).
"Radio Officers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
" Under §§ 8(A) (3) and 8(b) (2), if a union operating under a union

security agreement expels a member for any reason other than failure to
pay dues, e.g., failure to pay a disciplinary fine, the union forfeits its right
to require that he pay dues as a condition of employment. Taft-Hartley §§
8(A) (3), 8(b) (2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(A) (3), 158(b)(2) (1964).
"Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.), rev'd per
curiam, 250 U.S. 892 (1955).
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crucial strike period could be catastrophic, especially in the case of
a weak union.45 The proscription of judicial enforcement of union
fines would also present a loophole for workers intent upon avoiding
their financial obligation to the union. A worker might join the
union and then intentionally violate union discipline in order to
escape the single obligation the section 8(A) (3) proviso meant to
impose upon him: financial support of his bargaining representatives.
The union would be forced to tolerate his misbehavior, which
very likely would be detrimental to solidarity, or to expel him. Undoubtedly, a member could force expulsion by a continuing calculated course of misconduct.
The evils created by the proscription of judicial enforcement in
the security shop situation are not insoluable. They may be neutralized by allowing unions to suspend delinquent members without
forfeiting their right to collect dues, 4" or by permitting unions to
demote or "expel" delinquent members to financial core statusobligated to pay their share of the bargaining costs. Title I of
the Landrum-Griffin Ac 4 7 provides adequate safeguards against
arbitrary use of these powers by the unions.
Conclusion
The means of intra-union discipline sanctioned by Allis-Chalmers,
especially in the context of a security shop agreement, allow too
great a margin for an impermissible degree of invasion of members' rights. The adoption of the proposed judicial safeguards
would make it a much closer case-to be determined by the feasibility of the alternative methods of enforcement. The relative
strength of unions and members negates the necessity of the addition
of this new weapon to the union arsenal which already includes the
proviso-secured expulsion sanction along with potent diverse modes
of informal ostracism. Proscription of judicial enforcement obviates to a great extent the necessity of inquiry as to the voluntariness
of the association since the member may opt out of the union
" Members of a strong well-established union with good internal benefits

would be more likely to pay their fines than expose themselves to loss of
those benefits. But a member of a weak union with little or no internal
benefits would likely opt for expulsion to avoid the expense of both the fine
and future dues. Therefore the weak union would have to either condone
wrong doing or suffer the loss of revenue by depleting its ranks.
4876 YALE L.J. 563, 567 (1967).
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act §§ 101-105, 29
U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1964).

19681

UCC SALES WARRANTIES

at no dollar cost to himself. Also, limiting the ultimate union
discipline to expulsion provides an internal restraint upon
unions to impose only reasonable fines, while at the same time
providing them with a real incentive to make themselves more
desirable so that members will opt to pay the fines rather than be
expelled.
WILLIAM

J.

DocmRY

Sales-Products Liability-Sales Warranties of the

Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code sales warranties have caused
several practical and theoretical problems in determining the appropriate basis of manufacturer liability in defective product cases.
The growth of non-fault liability,' either in tort or on the sales
contract, has been characterized by increasing permissiveness toward
consumer recovery against remote manufacturers. This note is
addressed to the relation between the Code scheme of recovery and
common law non-fault remedies.
The basic Code money-damages remedy' for a purchaser of
a defective product is an action on the sales contract for breach of
the seller's warranty, express or implied. The Code sales warranties correspond roughly to those developed at common law.3 Section
' See Prosser, The Assaudt Upon the Citidel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [Hereinafter cited as Prosser].
2 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-711 for buyer's remedies in general.
All citations are made to the 1962 official text of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The Code has been adopted in forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia.
Prosser termed the sales warranty "a freak hybrid born of illicit intercourse of tort and contract." The action for breach of warranty was originally on the case, a tort action, and resembled the action for deceit. Prosser
states that it was not until 1778 that an action on a contract for breach of
warranty was held to lie at all. However, once the action on the contract
was permitted, the defenses to breach of contract, principally lack of privity
and limitation of consequential damages, became entrenched in the law.
The warranty concept evolved, first through the food cases, to the point
where implied warranties were imposed by operation of the law regardless
of the seller's contractual undertaking. Liability was non-fault and in
effect tort duties were imposed on sellers. Since MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), removed the privity barrier
only with respect to negligence liability, courts invented a variety of devices,
such as fictitious agency or warranties running with the product, to circumvent the privity rules. See Prosser at 1124. However, the defense of lack
of privity to the breach of warranty action remains viable in many jurisdictions, and, further, the warranty has retained elements of both tort and

